1、本科毕业论文外文翻译 外文题目： The Role of FDI in the Czech Automotive Industry 出 处： A Successful Transformation ， Contributions of Economics，2008， 185-209 作 者： Petr Pavlnek 原 文： The Role of FDI in the Czech Automotive Industry The role of FDI has been considered to be critical in the post-socialist economic deve
2、lopment of CEE (e.g. Dunning 1993:25； Ozawa 2000:xii； Lankes and Stern 1997:1) because FDI is viewed as an “engine of development” (Cski 1995:112), a vehicle of economic modernization and a driving force of productivity development (Hunya 2000:8, 12). Some commentators even consider FDI to be a “shi
3、p of riches that will ensure economic prosperity” (Kojima 2001:22). By the late 1990s, it has become a clich in CEE to consider the role of foreign capital to be superior to that of domestic capital in enterprise restructuring. This positive view of FDI resulted at least partly from failure of domes
4、tic privatization schemes to generate strategic restructuring at the enterprise level in countries such as Czechia and Slovakia.1 It seems, however, that such views tend to exaggerate the actual effects of FDI in CEE and its role in the post-1989 economic transformation, because the overall volumes
5、of FDI in CEE remain low when compared to other world regions.2 The generally assumed superior performance of enterprises with foreign capital compared to domestic enterprises has been very difficult to verify empirically with the exception of manufacturing (Szanyi 2000:76). It is also important to
6、keep in mind that effects of FDI in CEE have been geographically and sectorally very uneven (e.g. Pavlnek and Smith 1998； Pavlnek 2002a, 2002b) and that FDI does not necessarily lead to automatic economic success in the foreign invested enterprises (FIEs joint ventures and foreign-owned companies).
7、Indeed, the research on FDI in CEE points towards a large diversity of FIEs in all possible respects and, consequently, to the need to better understand this diversity as well as the overall economic effects of FDI in CEE countries (Szanyi 2000:74). Two types of FDI studies in CEE can be identified:
8、 First are the studies that typically investigate FDI from national and macroeconomic perspectives and focus on analyses of empirical data (e.g. Hunya 2000； Artisienet al. 1993； Zloch-Christy 1995). Second are the case studies of individual investments from various sectors (e.g. Estrin et al. 1997,
9、2000a). This chapter focuses on the role of FDI in the transformation of the Czech automotive industry. FDI has played a crucial role in the transformation of the passenger car industry in Central Europe (CE) and its selective peripheral integration into the European automotive production system in
10、the 1990s (see Pavlnek 2002a, 2002b for details； Chap. 1). The Czech automotive industry has experienced a large influx of FDI resulting in the deep foreign penetration of the sector.3 By the end of 2005, FIEs accounted for 83% of the production capacity in the Czech automotive industry (AIA 2007).
11、The goal of this chapter is to investigate the role of FDI in the privatization and transformation of the Czech automotive industry at the enterprise level using the case study approach. It is based upon actual experiences of selected automotive sector enterprises with FDI. The aim is to better unde
12、rstand the effects of FDI on enterprise restructuring. Based on this approach, the chapter hopes to illustrate the complexity of changes associated with FDI at the enterprise level in CEE. This chapter does not deal with VWs acquisition of koda Auto, which has been considered the most successful aut
13、omotive investment in Czechia and in CEE as a whole, because its analysis is carried out in Chap. 3. Instead, I focus on the situation in the automotive components sector and, to a lesser extent, in truck, bus and tractor production. This chapter also illustrates how the changing governmental polici
14、es towards FDI strongly influenced FDI inflows in the country and affected the Czech automotive components sector in the 1990s. The decision to form a particular JV was made by enterprises and had to be approved by the government, which also had to approve all greenfield investments. As in Chap. 5 t
15、he information presented in this chapter is based upon indepth interviews conducted with chief executive officers (CEOs) and top managers of 20 car component suppliers in Czechia in 2000 and 2001. While only nine of these suppliers were fully or partially foreign-owned at the time of the interview,
16、the top managers of Czech-owned suppliers provided important insights and assessments of foreign-owned companies because four of them formed JVs with foreign partners that involved parts of their companies (Table 5.1 in Chap. 5).4 Most of the remaining companies interviewed have seriously considered
17、 forming JVs with foreign partners in the past or at the time of the interview and undertook negotiations with potential foreign investors.5 The chapter also draws on interviews conducted by the author at the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade and koda Auto in 1996 and at koda Auto, Tatra, Daewoo-
18、Avia and Karosa vehicle manufacturers in 1999 and interviews at 14 Czech-based component suppliers and koda Auto in 2005. While this type of research cannot and does not claim to be a fully representative sample of the Czech automotive industry as a whole and its results therefore cannot be easily g
19、eneralized, I believe that interviews with key actors represented by top managers of selected companies provide important insights into the actual processes of enterprise privatization and transformation related to FDI. As such, it complements the empirical studies of enterprise restructuring and ef
20、fects of FDI at the enterprise level. The chapter begins with a discussion of changing governmental policies toward FDI and its effects on privatization of automotive component producers in the 1990s. Next is an analysis of immediate FDI effects at the level of individual enterprises. In particular,
21、 the issues of disciplining labor and the contested nature of enterprise restructuring are discussed. I then consider advantages of foreign ownership for Czech enterprises and I also provide examples of failed cooperation between domestic producers and foreign partners in the Czech motor industry. F
22、inally, I briefly investigate 6.1 Governmental Policies, FDI and Privatization General governmental economic policies and specific policies towards FDI play an important role in attracting FDI to a particular country. They are sometimes considered to be the most important factor affecting FDI inflow
23、s (e.g. Lall 1996:425). The attitude of the Czech government toward FDI has undergone considerable changes since 1990. Three stages could be distinguished: the period before the 1992 parliamentary elections of governmental incentives to selected foreign investors； the 199297 period during which fore
24、ign investors were not originally offered any incentives to invest and domestic investors were generally preferred； and the post-1997 period of strong governmental incentives and support for FDI. The most successful JVs in the Czech automotive sector were formed between 1990 and 1992 when the Czech
25、government followed a policy of careful choice of foreign partners for selected Czech enterprises. Examples in the automobile industry include the kodaVW and BarumContinental JVs. As we could see in previous chapters, the post-1992 Czech government under the leadership of Vclav Klaus generally disap
26、proved of the entry of foreign capital into Czech companies and instead it preferred the so-called “Czech way” of privatization, i.e. privatizing Czech companies to Czech owners using the Czech rather than foreign capital. This attitude is somewhat surprising given Klauss liberal rhetoric. However,
27、he considered property included in JVs as “lost to privatization” (Myant 1993:244). As Jan Vrba, the pre-1992 minister of industry, pointed out “the sale of enterprises to foreigners was not popular after the 1992 elections and least so to Germans” (Pral and Lk 1999). In 1992, despite the perceived
28、lack of domestic capital, the government decided not to provide any tax incentives for foreign investors. The deputy finance minister argued in 1993 that the incentives would “deform the natural economic structure of the Czech Republic”(LN 1993:12). Although companies were relatively free to choose
29、their privatization method, the post-1992 elections government of Vclav Klaus encouraged as many large companies as possible to participate in the governmental voucher privatization scheme.6 In particular, the participation of well known companies in voucher privatization, such as the heavy off-road
30、 truck maker Tatra Kopivnice, was strongly promoted mainly by the supporters of Klaus to increase the popularity of the scheme (see Chap. 4). As wee could see in the case of Tatra, for example, the government indirectly exerted a strong pressure on its managers to participate in voucher privatizatio
31、n through aides of Vclav Klaus assuring Tatras managers that voucher privatization would protect their positions and control of the company. The cases of Kablo Velk Mezi and Magneton Krom described below show that the government often decided politically against proposed JVs without providing any explanation for its decisions. In the case of truck production, the Klaus government did not continue negotiations with MercedesBenz AG about the 250 million USD MercedesAviaLiaz JV approved by the previous government in March 1992 that
