1、苏州大学本科生毕业设计（论文） 1 THE MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT FOR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW Due to the inconsistency between the plain language of states accomplice liability legislation and its respective interpretation in the state courts, many states accomplice laws present a confused pictur
2、e in terms of the laws stance on accomplice liability. No aspect of this law is more complex than that relating to the mental state requirement for accomplice liability. Nevertheless, if one engages in a cursory examination of the legal literature, case law, and state legislation concerning the ment
3、al state requirement for accomplice liability, essentially three approaches surface. These approaches differ in the degree to which they hold an individual culpable for the conduct of another. First, there is the perspective (which is particularly popular in the academic community) that favors a ver
4、y limited, narrow approach whereby accomplice liability is dependent upon a finding that an accuseds purpose was to encourage or assist another in the commission of a crime. Meanwhile, a second perspective (which the Model Penal Code follows to some extent2) tolerates a more expansive approach where
5、by an accomplices liability turns on whether the accomplice harbored the mental state required of the substantive crime allegedly aided or abetted. The first approach, asserts that an individual should only be liable for the acts of a principal if that individual acted with the specific intent to pr
6、omote or assist the principals commission of the crime. This theory holds that a mental state of knowledge or recklessness on the part of an alleged accomplice is insufficient to hold the alleged accomplice culpable. Jurisdictions following this approach will only hold an alleged accomplice liable f
7、or the crimes that the alleged accomplice intended a perpetrator commit. Also, if the perpetrator commits a secondary crime in pursuance of the intended crime, the accomplice is not liable for the secondary crime unless the accomplice intended to promote or facilitate this offense as well. So long a
8、s the alleged accomplice intended to somehow assist or encourage the principals criminality, the accomplice is liable even if the substantive crime only requires recklessness or negligence on the part of the principal. Thus, if A loans his gun to B knowing B intends to use it to shoot his neighbors
9、barking dog, A would not be an accomplice to Bs act unless he himself intends that Bs neighbors dog be shot. Likewise, if X gives the keys of her car to Y, who is intoxicated, knowing Y 苏州大学本科生毕业设计（论文） 2 intends to drive the car, X would not be criminally liable if Ys reckless driving kills or injur
10、es an innocent person. Thus, this might simply be described as the specific intent approach. The second approach, is what might be called the statutorily prescribed mental state approach. According to this somewhat more expansive view, an individual may be liable for a crime the individual did not s
11、pecifically intend for the perpetrator to commit. Rather, liability attaches if the alleged accomplice acted with the mental culpability required for the commission of the offense. Thus, states following this approach will hold an individual liable for the conduct of another if that individual posse
12、ssed the mental state prescribed by the states substantive criminal statute, whether the requisite mental state for conviction is intent, knowledge, recklessness, or criminal negligence. Returning to the hypothetical discussed above, where A loans his gun knowing of Bs intent to shoot the neighbors
13、barking dog, A would now be criminally liable for the knowing, unauthorized infliction of injury or death on an animal, even though A has no intent for the crime occur. Likewise, where X gives her car keys to the intoxicated Y knowing Y will drive her car and Y recklessly kills Z, X would be liable
14、for reckless homicide along with Y if we agree X harbors a reckless state of mind. Both A and X would be liable because each acts with the mental culpability required for the commission of their respective offenses. Category II states can be divided into two subcategories: (1) states that articulate
15、 the Category II approach statutorily, and (2) states whose courts have judicially interpreted the Category II approach from statutes void of Category II language. The states that statutorily follow the Category II approach can be further divided into states that require the statutorily prescribed m
16、ental state with regard to result-oriented crimes alone, and those that do not differentiate between conduct- and result-oriented crimes. The Model Penal Code, codified by a number of states, allows for liability if an accomplice possessed the requisite mental state for conviction of a perpetrator w
17、hen causing a particular result is an element of the crime (e.g., the death in homicide； the injury in battery). However, if the crime focuses on the conduct of the actor rather than the result (e.g., the unauthorized entry in burglary； the substantial step in criminal attempt), it is necessary that
18、 the accomplice have the specific intent that the principal commit the crime. States 苏州大学本科生毕业设计（论文） 3 that do not distinguish between conduct- and result-oriented crimes will hold an individual liable for the conduct of another as long as the individual possessed the statutorily prescribed mental s
19、tate for the substantive crime. The third approach, which this Article refers to as Category 1I1, is the most expansive of the approaches. States following this approach will hold an actor liable for all the natural and probable consequences of the intended crime. Although some jurisdictions may not
20、 use this exact language, these states reject the necessity of proving the accomplice had either the specific intent required by the Category I approach or the statutorily prescribed mental state mandated by the Category II approach. Therefore, if the principal committed a secondary crime in the cou
21、rse of carrying out the target crime even if the accomplice had no way of knowing or anticipating that an incidental or secondary crime would occur, a court will nonetheless convict the accomplice of the incidental crime if the court determines it to be a natural and probable consequence of the inte
22、nded crime. Now the hypothetical above become really interesting. Assume after B shoots his neighbors barking dog with As gun, the neighbor, C, becomes angry and engages B in a physical altercation during which B shoots and injures C. If we agree the altercation and resultant injury suffered by C ar
23、e natural and probable consequences of As arming B while knowing of Bs intentions, A would be liable as an accomplice for Bs battery of C. In the example where X gives her keys to the intoxicated Y (which itself is a violation of the states motor vehicle code), now assume Y not only recklessly becom
24、es involved in a fatal vehicle crash but also that Y collides with a gasoline truck, which explodes and causes a nearby building to catch fire. If we agree that when X gives the intoxicated Y the keys to her car she should be held accountable for all natural and probable consequences, it is arguable
25、 that X is liable not only for reckless homicide if Y is involved in a fatal collision while driving Xs car but also for criminal damage to property or perhaps arson. Or, worse yet, if a firefighter or building occupant dies in the fire, it might even be asserted that X is liable for manslaughter. M
26、embers of the academic community, including Professors Wayne La Fave, Joshua Dressier, and Audrey Rogers, have strongly criticized the Category III approach because it holds an individual to the same culpability as a principal for a crime the commission of which the accomplice had no knowledge of or intent to
