1、外文文献翻译 部分原文： Lying and Truth-Telling in Children: From Concept to Action Fen Xu, BeijingNormalUniversity Xuehua Bao, Zhejiang University Genyue Fu, ZhejiangNormal University Victoria Talwar, McGillUniversity Kang Lee, University of Toronto, Canada&University of California, San Diego Lying is a commo
2、n social phenomenon. It occurs regularly in various. For children, there are two types of lies that are of great importance during their socialization. One type is the lies that violate moral rules as they are typically told to benefit oneself at the expense of others. As a result of the antisocial
3、nature of this type of lie, it is universally discouraged by childrens caregivers and teachers from a very early age. The other type of lies are those that are told with an intention to help, not harm, another individual (e.g., faking liking an undesirable gift in front of a gift-giver) and are thus
4、 prosocial in nature. Although philosophers and theologians have long debated about whether prosocial lies should be morally sanctioned (Bok, 1978), in everyday practice, such lies are told frequently (DePaulo & Bell, 1996； DePaulo & Kashy, 1998), and often entail positive values (Nyberg, 1993). Som
5、e theorists such as Sweetser (1987) have even suggested that in some situations prosocial lies are not only socially acceptable but also are not lies at all. There has been extensive research on the development of lying which dates back to the beginning of developmental psychology (e.g., Binet, 1896
6、； Darwin, 1877； Piaget, 1932). This long-standing interest in this topic is a result of the fact that lying can serve as a window into many aspects of childrens developing minds, for example, intelligence (Binet, 1896； Lewis, 1993), theory of mind (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989； Leekam, 1993； Peskin
7、, 1992； Peterson, 1995； Peterson, & Seeto, 1983； Polak & Harris, 1999； Sodian, 1991； Talwar, Gordon, and Lee, 2007), moral understanding (Piaget, 1932), personality and character formation， (Hartshorne & May, 1928), and childrens competence as witnesses in the courts of law (Goodman et al., 2006； Ly
8、on, 2000； Strichartz & Burton, 1990； Talwar, Lee, Bala, & Lindsay, 2002, 2004； for a review, see Lee, 2000). To date, most studies have focused on the development of antisocial lies and can be divided into two major streams. One stream investigates childrens conceptions and moral judgments of antiso
9、cial lies. Extensive research has revealed that children from very early on are taught explicitly or implicitly about the negative moral implications associated with antisocial lies. They are also strongly discouraged from telling this type of lie (Cameron, Chen, & Lee, 2001； Wilson, Smith, & Ross,
10、2003). Perhaps for this reason, the conceptual understanding of antisocial type of lies emerges as early as 3 years of age (Siegal & Peterson, 1998； Talwar et al., 2002). With regard to childrens moral judgments of lying, evidence shows that even preschoolers understand that antisocial lies entail n
11、egative moral implications (Bussey, 1992, 1999； Talwar et al., 2002). The other stream of research, pioneered by Binet (1896), Darwin (1877), and Hartshorne and May (1928), examines childrens lying behavior for trickery, personal protection, or benefit (Chandler et al., 1989； Lewis, Stanger, & Sulli
12、van, 1989； Peskin, 1992； Polak & Harris, 1999； Talwar & Lee, 2002a). It has been found that even preschoolers tell lies with intent to deceive (Chandler et al., 1989； Peskin, 1992). Young child lie-tellers are generally skilled in masking their nonverbal behaviors (e.g., making eye contact while lyi
13、ng: Lewis et al., 1989； Talwar & Lee, 2002a), but poor at concealing their deception in their verbal statements (e.g., blurting out the name of a toy that they claimed not to have peeked at: Polak & Harris, 1999； Talwar & Lee, 2002a, 2008； Talwar, Gordon, et al., 2007). In contrast to the extensive
14、literature on antisocial lying, there is very limited research on the development of lie-telling for politeness purposes. Research on this issue should offer a unique perspective for understanding social development in children owing to the multifaceted nature of prosocial lie-telling. More specific
15、ally, to take an appropriate action in a politeness situation, one must assess, and reason about, both moral and social conventional rules regarding interpersonal interaction. Turiel and his colleagues (Helwig & Turiel, 2002； Nucci & Turiel, 2000； Smetana & Turiel, 2003； Turiel, 2002) have found tha
16、t moral and social conventional rules are distinctive domains in the realm of social life and social thought. Moral rules are concerned with what is right and what is wrong as well as regulating how individuals ought to behave toward each other based on the principles of welfare and justice.In contr
17、ast, social conventional rules are concerned with uniformities that define social expectations regarding appropriate behaviors within a specific society and serve functions of social coordination. Typically, these rules deal with individuals social thoughts and actions in their respective domains. F
18、or example, moral rules prohibit killing of another human being, whereas social conventional rules may require one to dress properly at a formal social gathering. Politeness, however, cuts across both domains. In the politeness situation, one must assess, and reason about, the applicability of vario
19、us moral and social conventional rules to take a morally and socially appropriate action.More significantly, the politeness situation brings to the fore the inherent contradictions in the rule system in either the moral or social conventional domains, respectively. In the moral domain, the concern for others wellbeing and the need to avoid harm should motivate one to tell a prosocial lie (e.g., I really like your gift or You look
