1、 唐山师范学院本科毕业论文 外文翻译 题 目 论抗战时期国民党的敌后游击战 学 生 韩为静 指导教师 闫永增 教授 学 号 061100241015 年 级 2006 级本科 专 业 历史学 系 别 政史系 唐山师范学院政史系 2010 年 5 月 - 1 - Deterioration I939-I945: the Military John K.Fairbank After the fall of Wuhan and Canton in late October 1938, the character of the war and conditions in the Nationalist
2、 areas changed profoundly. The fighting progressively entered a stalemate. Especially after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Nationalist leaders anticipated that the Western Allies could defeat Japan without the necessity of further Chinese sacrifices. After all, they had foug
3、ht Japan alone for four and a half years already. They consequently devoted less attention to combating the Japanese than to containing the Communists, whose growing power and territorial control augured badly for national unity and stability in the postwar period. Most of all, however, the National
4、ist government at Chungking found itself caught in a seemingly irreversible process of deterioration military, economic, social, and political that left it by 1945 weak and demoralized. When the Nationalists did not capitulate following their defeat at Wuhan in October 1938, the Japanese leaders rea
5、lized that they had misjudged the Chinese powers of resistance and that the imperial army would merely exhaust itself if it continued to pursue the elusive defenders into the hinterlands. They therefore adopted a new strategy, stressing political means to secure control of China. First, they would c
6、onsolidate control of the areas overrun since July 1937. They now effectively controlled only some 10 per cent of the territory in North and Central China - primarily the major cities and areas bordering the major railways and highways. They needed to eliminate many pockets of resistance and to harn
7、ess the productive capabilities of the occupied areas to the economy of the homeland. Second, the Japanese determined to wear down the Nationalists until they collapsed from internal disintegration. They thus simultaneously tightened their economic blockade of the Nationalist areas and began a destr
8、uctive air war. In the spring of 1939 they seized Nanchang in Kiangsi, cutting the important Chekiang-Hunan railway. In November they landed an amphibious force at Po-hai (Pakhoi) in western Kwangtung, and advanced a hundred miles to take Nanning, the capital of Kwangsi. This was a damaging blow to
9、the Nationalists, for it severed the new railway line from Hanoi over which the Chinese were obtaining fully a third of their critically needed imports. Then, in September 1940 the Japanese occupied the northern part of French Indo-China, closing the important rail line between Hanoi and Kunming. Th
10、ereafter the Nationalists were dependent for supplies from the outside world upon the newly opened but barely passable Burma Road, air transport from Hong Kong (which the Japanese were to occupy in December 1941), and the long caravan and truck route from Russia (see map). The Japanese air raids str
11、uck indiscriminately at military and civilian targets. Their purpose was less to destroy military installations and factories than to demoralize the population. Virtually all cities in the Nationalist area, including Kweilin, Kunming and Sian, were hit. Chungking, however, suffered most severely. Bo
12、mbed 268 times during 1939 41, much of the city was gutted, and many thousands died (4,400 were killed in just the first two days of heavy raids in May 1939). Yet neither the air raids nor the blockade broke the Chinese will to resist. Indeed, the perseverance of the Chungking population remained fi
13、rm as long as the bombings continued, and wilted only after they ceased in late 1941. The blockade was less than a complete success, - 2 - in part because the Nationalists in July 1939 had legalized, and thereafter actively promoted, the trade in most goods from areas held by the Japanese. The Japan
14、ese were at a loss to stop this trade. They were incapable of guarding every foot, or even every mile, of the more than 2,000 miles of border between occupied and unoccupied China. Many Japanese also actively colluded in this commerce, so that a sizeable but indeterminate part of Nationalist Chinas
15、imports during the war came through this so-called smuggling trade. A momentous discussion by the Japanese cabinet in July 1940 also affected their operations in China. Perceiving that success in China would continue to elude them unless they obtained access to the rich natural resources of South-Ea
16、st Asia, and convinced that the Western powers were preoccupied with the war in Europe, the Japanese leaders agreed to broaden the scope of imperial expansion beyond the China theatre. They hoped, although without conviction, that they could attain their goals in the south by diplomacy. This decisio
17、n inevitably altered the character of the China war and also led, within little more than a year, to the attack on Pearl Harbor. On the Chinese side, strategic and political considerations had persuaded the Nationalist leadership to wage a war of attrition. Chiang Kai-shek claimed that the Japanese
18、were spreading their resources of men and equipment too thin by advancing across the expanse of China. The longer our enemy struggles, the more he involves himself in difficulties； while the longer we struggle, the stronger and more determined we become. Chiang, like the Japanese, also wished to avo
19、id decisive battles, because he anticipated that the Western Allies would ultimately be drawn into the struggle against Japan. Initially he looked to the Allies merely for material aid and for economic sanctions against Japan. But after Pearl Harbor-news of which was greeted joyously in Chungking he
20、 expected that Great Britain and especially the United States, with its enormous technological resources, would assume the major burden of defeating Japan. By 1943, the American ambassador to China, Clarence E. Gauss, observed that The Chinese have persuaded themselves that they are too tired and to
21、o worn and too ill-equipped to make greater effort, especially when such effort may not be necessary； and that they can sit back, holding what they have against the Japanese, and concentrate their planning upon Chinas post-war political and economic problems. The chief political problem that distrac
22、ted the Nationalists attention from the Japanese was the growing friction with the Chinese Communists. After the New Fourth Army incident in January 1941 (seep. 665) the united front had virtually ceased to exist. Influential Nationalist leaders most notably the minister of war, Ho Ying-chin, and th
23、e party apparatchik, Chen Li-fu-at various times stridently advocated a final extermination campaign against the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek resisted these pressures, in large part because he feared that the Allies would cease aiding the Nationalist army if it became openly involved in civil war. Ye
24、t, since mid-1939, he had committed many of his best troops - at various times between 150,000 and 500000-to blockading the Communists base in the north-west. Although both Nationalists and Japanese after late 1938 were content to wage a war of attrition, fighting by no means abated completely. Occa
25、sionally the Japanese launched an offensive to attain limited objectives. In June 1940, for example, they seized the important Yangtze River port of I-chang in order to staunch the flow of goods between the rice-bowl provinces of Central China and Chungking and to obtain an air base closer to the Na
26、tionalist area. In the summer of 1942, after General James H. Doolittles bombing of Tokyo, the Japanese struck into Chekiang and Kiangsi with 100000 troops to destroy air bases that might be used in future raids against the home islands. Periodically, too, they launched attacks against the Nationalist lines, less to occupy new territory than to ravage the countryside, seize or destroy recent harvests, prevent the Nationalists from amassing potentially dangerous
