1、中北大学 2012 届毕业论文英文文献与翻译 第 1 页 共 12 页 Equipment, network-centric warfare systems for the war fighter America David Hardisty Abstract： from the point of view of information connectivity technology means discussed the importance of hardware support for network-centric warfare, pointed out the problems i
2、n this regard, the final proposed improvement measures. Key words： The U.S. Military Transformation Military theory Network Centric Warfare 一、 the issues filed About the network-centric warfare and the Navy is developing the FORCE net reported overwhelming, one might think the Navy is rapidly develo
3、ped into a perfect design, closely linked to the troops: it has a seamless data access through appropriate command and control sensor linked with our existing large number of weapons systems. However, at least in the near future, the situation is not the case. Navy in the network-centric warfare con
4、cepts to being used or in the development of weapons and sensors have not made significant progress. This is especially true in naval aviation. We are still the same platform centric warfare to the procurement and development of weapons systems. Effective implementation of network-centric warfare, a
5、nd use it to our tactical forces skillfully linking, we must re-group. Anti-chain sequence - be carefully checked each task in the field of detection, decision-making, attack assessment, to determine information exchange requirements for that mission area between the platforms. Regrouping must comba
6、t personnel connected with the development and connection of our system of technical experts together. The only way we can achieve combat systems, combat the simultaneous development of the theory, and benefit from a network-centric warfare. Conceptually, the Navy has been using the network-centric
7、warfare. Naval Transformation Roadmap to tomorrows Navy Marine Corps team portrayed as the network connection, the joint integration of sea-based force projection forces. In order to implement the network-centric warfare, emphasizing the human factor, the Navys 中北大学 2012 届毕业论文英文文献与翻译 第 2 页 共 12 页 FO
8、RCE net concept of sensor networks, weapons, decision-support tools and soldiers from the seabed to space connected together to provide faster decision-making at all levels of command authorities and decision-making accuracy. In order to implement the network-centric warfare and the establishment of
9、 the FORCE net, the Navy is to make efforts, including the introduction and use of sea-based systems of the 21st century IT. These are mainly web-based, although they significantly improve the operations of the General Staff bodies and surface platform, but virtually no contact with the Naval Air Fo
10、rce. In the United States Navy, was commended for a common operational picture in the navy Global Command and Control system, and coordinated operations through which troops can conduct its own, but it is only from the tactical data link one-way passive feedback. Common operational picture contains
11、information from other sources can not automatically be extended, not even by link an l6 data link to the way transmission of digital tactical platform. There is no such information to extend, if not transmitted by voice, not able to important tactical information to the sensors and weapons combat p
12、latforms, it can not hit the target. The preparation of the implementation of network-centric warfare there is a huge gap, thus impeding the naval network-centric warfare to achieve its intended goals. The development of a joint network of fire is another important action of the network-centric warf
13、are, designed to address the serious shortage exists in the positioning and the fight against fast moving targets, time-sensitive. Joint network of fire in the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance management and carrier-based target selection and combat, command and control function integra
14、tion has made remarkable progress, but it can quickly crack down on weapons systems can be a moving target engagement information capacity is limited the. Led by the Marine Combat Development Command, Navy experiments, focused on network-centric warfare, time-sensitive targeting and real-time to com
15、bat. Fleet battle experiments are to develop and test the concept of network of fire, which indicates that the current structure for the deployment of a joint network of fire combat advantage. The 中北大学 2012 届毕业论文英文文献与翻译 第 3 页 共 12 页 experiment to promote on how to speed up the time-sensitive targeti
16、ng and real-time understanding of the strike, but with the actual weapon system integration, there are weak links. India in the Fleet Battle Experiment, the target information is transmitted through the infrequently carry the AN/AWW-l3 of walleye data link pod is left blank attack fighter. Naval com
17、bat and Air Warfare Center strongly demand that all aircraft with a joint network of fire aircraft link, not just those who carry pods and in a small number of aircraft within the Zhimiao line. The center also require future experiments the joint network of fire BVR capability of future data link wi
18、th the Naval Air Force, that link a l6 data link connection. Unfortunately, the Naval Combat Development Command did not pay enough attention to l6 Connection link a data link. Juliet Fleet Battle Experiment (2002), the joint network of fire connected to the data link with link a l6 Kilo Fleet Battl
19、e Experiment (2003) demonstrated with a single operational platform (E-2 experimental car) software connection. The implementation of Navy network-centric warfare, there is a fallacy: the distance in the information age does not matter. In the static world of fiber-optic cable to connect the land-ba
20、sed system, this view may be correct. But in the hundreds of thousands, have only limited channels of communication and rapid mobility tactical platform world, this view is incorrect. At least the next l0 years, the tactical decision-making level is still narrow information channel filled with a wea
21、lth of information from tactical sensors. Implementation of the recent network-centric warfare, we must ensure that the bandwidth between the tactical platforms can best support the killing chain. Thus, network-centric warfares second fallacy: I believe the free flow of information in the network wi
22、ll produce the best results. In large-scale, time-sensitive complex engagement, this is a big mistake. Policy makers need to focus. Won the tactical engagement needs a faster rate than the enemys use of anti-chain. Irrelevant or incomplete information will cause confusion or delay in the decision-making process is fatal to their own troops. Combat simulation focused information processing in an appropriate format for transmission to the decentralized decision-makers will enhance
