1、Evolution and Thinking of the Accounting Supervision Mode of Chinas State-owned Enterprises Guo Yaxiong School of Accountancy, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, P.R.C, 330013 4. COUNTERMEASURES 4.1. IMPLEMENT MODE COMBINATION MANAGEMENT Accounting supervision modes of state-owned enterpri
2、ses are various. Full implementation of these modes would be a waste of resources, increase the difficulty of accounting management. Its necessary to targeted select two or more accounting supervision modes to implement accounting supervision according to operation characteristics of the supervised
3、state-owned enterprises. The author believes that, generally, the internal audit system is a conventional system. If you want to select systems among the assigned accountant system, assignment board of supervisors system and outside director system, the number of systems chosen is better no more tha
4、n two. At the same time, its no need to implement assigning accountants system and dispatching board of supervisors system in the same enterprise, and its inappropriate to promote outside director system in a large scale. 4.2. Improve the efficiency of accounting supervision. Asymmetric information
5、theory suggests that private information possessed by agents is unobservable, hidden action is unverifiable, thus the biggest problem brought is the opportunistic behavior. Therefore, its not necessary to emphasize the diversified forms of accounting supervision of state-owned enterprises, but neces
6、sary to emphasize the actual results, the efficiency of the accounting supervision, and limit opportunistic behavior of agents. Firstly, the appointment and assignment personnel should quickly master financial information of the enterprise such as financial results, operating results and cash flow,
7、and be familiar with production and business activities of the enterprise. Secondly, the responsibilities must be assigned to individuals, safeguard mechanisms for implementation should be established, and someone should be assigned to track, supervise, inspect and evaluate the implementation of the
8、 system .Thirdly, establish a national accounting supervision experts database of state-owned enterprises, strengthen job training, and build a professional team of high-level and rich experience in business management. Finally, the information acquired in implementation of a variety of accounting s
9、upervision modes should be shared. State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission should organize a variety of communication meetings, on-site meetings and seminars which can attract a lot of appointment and assignment personnel to participate in, to consult problems appearing in accounting s
10、upervision and communicate measures against the problems. 4.3. Make clear the limits of accounting supervision In the case of separation of ownership and management, insider control theory tells us that directors of enterprise in fact or in law control the enterprise, and make use of available infor
11、mation and the facility of management to gain more interests in enterprise management and decision-making. Accounting supervision is to maintain the economic order and prevent insider control to ensure normal economic activity of state-owned enterprises. State Asset Supervision and Administration Co
12、mmission, the personnel appointed and assigned should clearly understand the nature and limits of accounting supervision. Accounting supervision should be based on the economic development and economic efficiency of enterprises, and focus on long-term interests of enterprises. Regulation not only sh
13、ould be in place, but also moderate, and should not directly interfere or participate in the daily management activities. The personnel can act as judge, but should not act as athletes, neither act as a combination of both. 4.4. Develop incentive and restraint system According to principal-agent the
14、ory, as the principal need the help and cooperation of agents to accomplish the intended goal, the client will use a series of incentives to motivate agents to work hard to maximize the value of the overall agent, so as to achieve a balanced relationship between principal and agent. Under the circum
15、stance of market economy, incentive and restraint mechanisms of accounting supervision are particularly important and directly related to the efficiency of the accounting supervision. The subjects of accounting supervision are human beings, so they also need to be stimulated and restrained in accoun
16、ting supervision activities. Incentive mechanism promotes accounting supervisory staff to continually identify problems, and actively fight against accounting fraud. Restraint mechanism makes the actions of accounting supervisory personnel do not exceed the scope of laws and regulations. To do a goo
17、d job of accounting supervision, first, a law of encouraging and supporting appointed personnel to perform their duties should be coordinated. Various forms of incentive mechanisms, such as the priority in employment, option incentives and difference between the rewards, should be developed. Second,
18、 the sense of responsibility should be strengthened, restraint mechanisms such as occupational ban, administrative penalties, and legal liability accountability should be established, and accountability should be intensified. 中国国有企业会计监督模式的进化和思考 4 应对措施 4.1 实施模式组合管理 国有企业的会计监管模式是多方面的。全面实施这些模式将会浪费资源 ,提高
19、会计管理的难度。针对性的选择两个或两个以上的会计监管模式来实现会计监督根据运行特点监督国有企业 是非常必要的 。笔者认为 ,一般来说 ,内部审计系统是一个传统的系统。如果你想选择系统分配的会计系统中 ,分配的监事会制度和外部董事系统 ,系统数量的选择更好的不超过两个。与此同时 ,你就不需要实现分配会计师系统和调度的监事会制度在相同的企业 ,它不太合适 ,促进外部董事系统在较大范围的。 4.2 提高效率的会计监管。 信息不对称理论表明 ,私人信息被察觉到的代理 ,隐藏的行动是无凭无据 ,因此带来的最大问题是投机行为。因此 ,不需要强调 国有企业会计监督的 多种形式 ,但有必要强调实际结果 ,会计
20、监管的效率 ,并限制代理的机会主义行为。首先 ,任命和 分配任务 人员应迅速掌握企业的财务信息如财务业绩 、 经营成果 、 现金流量 ,熟悉 企业的 生产和经营活动。其次 ,责任必须分配 到 个人 ,保障机制的 实施措施 应该被建立 ,某人应该分配给 追踪 、监督、检测和评价这一制度的实施。第三 ,建立一个 国有企业的 全国的会计监管专家的数据库 ,加强职业培训 ,在企业管理方面建立 一个有高水平和丰富经验的 专业的团队。最后 ,在会计监督模式实施过程中所获得的各种各样的 信息 应该被共享 。国有资产监督管理委员会应组织各种交流会议 ,现场会议和研讨会 ,能吸引更多的任命和作业人员参加 ,磋商
21、 出现在会计监督和沟通 措施 中的问题并提出解决方案 。 4.3 明确会计监督的 权限 在所有权和管理权分离的情况下， 内部控制理论告诉我们 ,企业董事在 事实上或法律控制企业 ,并利用 管理过程中有效 的信息和设施 ,在企业的管理和决策中 获得更多的利益。会计监督是维护经济秩序 ,防止内部人控制以确保 国有企业的经济活动正常进行 。国有资产监督管理委员会 ,人事任命和分 配应该清楚地理解 会计监督 的性质和局限 性 。会计监督应根据经济发展和企业 的经济效益 ,专注于企业的长远利益。监管不仅应该 适当地 ,也应该适度进行 ,不应该直接干预或参与日常管理活动。 职员 可以作为 “裁判 ”,但不应该作为 “参赛选手 ”,更不应 充当二者的结合。
