1、 毕业 论文 外文资料翻译 题 目 恐怖网络的控制 :借鉴 9 11 委员会的报告 学 院 政治与公共管理学院 专 业 国际政治 班 级 国 政 0702 学 生 孙 镇 学 号 20072303049 指导教师 刘 雨 辰 二一 一 年 三 月 二十 日 济南大学毕业 论文外文资料翻译 - 1 - CONTROL OF A TERRORIST NETWORK: LESSONS FROM THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT RENATE MAYNTZ International Public Management Journal, 9(3), pages 295311 THE
2、 REPORT After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11,2001, two urgent questions were raised both in private and public discussions: why do they hate us so much to conceive of such a heinous deed, and why was it not prevented?The second question was asked most insisten
3、tly by the families of 9.11 victims, and it was a group of them who formed an organization and pressured Congress to institute, against the wishes of the Bush administration, a commission examining in detail the history of the attack and what the competent American authorities had done and had faile
4、d to do in order to prevent it. The bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, called the 9.11 Commission for short, embarked upon a sweeping investigation and produced a 567-page report that was published in 2004. The report traces the actions of the Al Qaeda terror
5、ists that led up to the 9.11 attacks, and describes in detail the counter-terrorism activities of the various bodies and organizations in the American security community. Focusing on the missed opportunities to prevent the attacks, the report indirectly points out the conditions of effective control
6、 of terrorist organizations of the kind represented by Al Qaeda. Having previously studied, on the basis of an extensive literature search, the organizational forms of both national and international terrorism (Mayntz 2004), I analyzed the results of the9.11 Report in order to find out what we may l
7、earn from it about the preconditions, and the chances, of controlling a terrorist network. This requires a sort of backward reasoning: by identifying the deficits responsible for the failure of prevention, we can derive the factors that would make for successful preventionbut we can also recognize c
8、onstraints and restrictions that are difficult to overcome. The following observations are based on a single source, the 9.11 Report. Of the rich literature spawned by the event, I have only used two additional publications that cover the same subject (Posner 2003, Clarke 2004). Though more critical
9、 than the 9.11 Report, which deliberately uses a matter-of-fact approach, neither of these publications contradicts its findings in points that would be important for the following analysis. 济南大学毕业 论文外文资料翻译 - 2 - CONTROL STRATEGIES There are two basic approaches to control: law enforcement and preve
10、ntion. Law enforcement, or the strategy to discover and destroy as the commission calls it, means to treat terrorists in the same way as criminals, and terrorist acts like criminal acts. Action is taken after the fact, by police forces (or the military). The criminal must be identified, in order to
11、be hunted, caught, judged, and finally, sentenced. Law enforcement is a measure of last resort if prevention has failed. Prevention takes place before the fact. Legal rules backed up by the threat of sanctions presumably serve the purpose of prevention by making norm violation a costly risk. A gener
12、al threat of sanctions attached to given categories of acts is, however, unable to prevent specific incidents, for instance of murder, robbery, embezzlement, or terrorism. Terrorists do behave rationally, but for many of them being caught, detained, or even killed are discounted costs； here the Law
13、and available law enforcement measures have no preventive effect. Prevention strategies can be either defensive, trying to protect the potential victim from attack, or offensive, trying to incapacitate the potential perpetratoreither directly by physically destroying him, or indirectly by making him
14、 unable to act and starving him out. There is a fluid boundary between these seemingly clear-cut categories. Border controls, for example, are both a defensive and an offensive measure: they protect the potential victim, but they also constrain the action space of terrorists. Promising control strat
15、egies of both types depend on the kind of threat. If the threat is a specific one, i.e., if it is possible to anticipate who might do what, where, and when, a feasible offensive strategy could be to detain the person or persons about to commit the act, and protection (sealing-off) of the threatened
16、site would be a sensible defensive strategy. This strategy has been successful in the case of the so-called Millennium scare. Here at least the critical time was known (around New Years Eve), and certain sites such as computer centers and places of celebration appeared to be especially threatened. A
17、ll agencies in the security community were on alert, and all threatened sites were highly protected. In the end, nothing happened. One terrorist who planned to bomb the Los Angeles airport was caught when he tried to enter at the Canadian border. The 9.11 attack was not a specific threat； when it ha
18、ppened, it came as a complete surprise to mostnot so much with respect to the organization behind it, but with respect to the time, the place, and above all the kind of attack, i.e., by using hijacked civilian aircraft as missiles. If there is no credible lead as to the place, the time, the kind of a threat, and the identity of the potential terrorists, only highly general defensive measures such as
