1、Governance In Seaport Clusters Peter W. de Erlangen 1. Introduction Apart from well-known physical factors such as the location, maritime accessibility and hinterland infrastructure, the governance of seaports is an important determinant of their performance. An analysis of the governance of seaport
2、s has mostly been limited to the role of the port authority. Notwithstanding the central role of port authorities in ports, we argue that an analysis of governance in seaports requires attention for the role of (private) firms. Institutional economic literature offers a useful framework for ana lysi
3、ng advantages and disadvantages of alternative governance mechanisms and provides a basis for ana lysing the roles of port authorities. In this paper we deal with the issue of cluster governance in seaports and illustrate our approach with an analysis of the port of Rotterdam. First, we briefly disc
4、uss the theoretical foundations of the cluster governance concept. Second, we discuss the role of port authorities in the governance of seaports. Third, we present empirical results of a survey among 43 cluster experts in Rotterdam on the governance of Rotterdams port cluster. We feminality the pape
5、r with conclusions. 2.The Quality Of Cluster Governance We define cluster governance as the mix of and relations between various mechanisms of coordination used in a cluster. The quality of the governance differs between clusters. The quality depends on the level of coordination costs and the scope
6、of coordination beyond price. Low coordination costs and much coordination beyond price improve the quality of governance. When the benefits of coordination are distributed unequally, when (the threat of) opportunistic behaviour prevents coordination or when benefits of coordination are uncertain, c
7、oordination beyond price does not arise spontaneously or instantaneously, even when benefits of coordination exceed costs. Therefore there is in general a shortage of coordination beyond price. More coordination beyond price improves the quality of the governance of clusters. 2.1Trust In clusters wh
8、ere the level of trust is high, (average) transaction costs are relatively low, because of low costs to specify contracts and low monitoring costs. Furthermore, costs of coordination beyond price are lower and as a consequence, more coordination beyond price will arise. The level of trust in a clust
9、er is influenced by the importance of reputation effects in a cluster. If reputation effects are strong, abusing trust has negative effects and therefore a culture of trust is sustained. 2.2 Intermediaries The presence of intermediaries lowers coordination costs and expands the scope of coordination
10、 beyond price, for three related reasons. First, they provide a bridging tie (Weevily and Zachery, 1999) between two or more otherwise not connected exchange partners. Second, intermediaries reduce coordination costs because they connect cognitions. Intermediaries can bridge cognitive differences be
11、tween firms that operate in different market environments. This role of connecting cognitions is especially important in clusters given the fact that clusters are characterism by a cognitive division of Limbourg (Belus and Tardigrada, 2000). 2.3Leader firms Leader firms are strategic Centre with sup
12、erior coordination skills and the ability to steer change (Lorenz and Baden fuller, 1995). The behaviour of leader firms influences the performance of the cluster as a whole, because leader firms have both the ability and incentive to invest in the competitiveness of a whole network of firms. We ide
13、ntify three investments of leader firms with positive effects (these can be termed leader firm externalities) on other firms in the cluster: Internationalism； innovation； contributing to solving collective action problems (Olson, 1971) Thus, leader firms can enable or even enforce cooperation and fo
14、r that reason add to the performance of clusters. 2.4Collective action in clusters The problem of collective action (Olson, 1971) is relevant in clusters. Even when collective benefits of co-operation to achieve collective goals exceed (collective) costs, such co-operation does not (always) develop spontaneously. Different CAPs (Collective Action Problems), such as education and training and innovation are relevant in clusters. For each CAP a governance regime
